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Abstract— Botnets, which consist of thousands of compromised 
machines, can cause significant threats to other systems by 
launching Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks, keylog- 
ging, and backdoors. In response to these threats, new effective 
techniques  are  needed  to  detect  the  presence  of  botnets.  In 
this paper, we have used an interception technique to monitor 
Windows Application Programming Interface (API) functions 
calls made by communication applications and store these calls 
with their arguments in log files. Our algorithm detects botnets 
based on monitoring abnormal activity by correlating the changes 
in log file sizes from different hosts. 
Keywords-IRC; DDoS; Bots; Botnets; API function calls 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Recently, an explosive growth of coordinated attacks has 
been noticed [1][6]. This kind of attack is performed by using 
Internet Relay Chat (IRC) networks to control compromised 
machines (zombies) and establish a distributed attack against 
other systems. These zombies are infected by a piece of mali- 
cious code named a bot [1][6]. Malicious bots are programmed 
to respond to various instructions generated by the attacker. 
A collection of compromised machines that are connected 
to a single channel on IRC networks forms a (Botnet). These 
machines can be controlled remotely by the attacker via 
command and control (C&C) to perform malicious activities 
such as  DDoS attack. A  DDoS attack is  established when 
many bots start to flood other networks by sending them large 
numbers of packets. Current botnets usage trends focus on 
email spamming/bombing, steal system information, program 
termination and extorting money from on-line businesses 
[3][6][7]. 
Most  current  bots  are  implemented to  use  a  centralized 
network,  which  allow  them  to  receive  instructions from  a 
central point. This makes the process of tracing the bot herder 
(i.e. the attacker) a relatively easy task. A more dangerous 
threat appears when the bot herder designs his/her bots to 
work in a Peer-to-Peer (P2P) environment, which makes the 
tracing process more complex. We focus on detecting botnets 
that use a centralized network. Detecting botnets in a P2P 
network forms our future work. 
There  have  been  several  studies  in  detecting  and  track- 
ing botnets using a non-productive resource (honeypot) and 
analysing traffic patterns [2][3]. A honeypot is a system 
resource that is not meant to provide any services to legitimate 
users. One problem with using honeypots is that they cannot 
detect  suspicious  traffic without  receiving  activity  directed 
against them [11]. In addition, monitoring IRC traffic patterns 
on standard ports used by IRC clients generates some false 
negatives since bots can run on non-standard ports. Moreover, 
there are no simple characteristics of communication channels 
that  can  be  used  for  detection. For  instance, the  outgoing 
connections have different lengths and the number of bytes 
transferred per connection is not fixed [2]. 
To address these problems, our aim is  to  detect botnets 
by  monitoring  the  change  of  behaviour  in  log  file  sizes 
across several hosts and find the correlation between these 
changes. This is due to the fact that bots are responding to 
the commands simultaneously which produce the same rate of 
change in each log file. Our approach does not process IRC 
traffic searching for specific patterns. Therefore, the amount 
of processing time required to detect botnets will be reduced. 
In addition, we do not monitor standard ports and worry about 
encrypted traffic, because our approach monitors the change 
of behaviour in the system not the content of each packet. 
We discuss the mechanism of collecting traffic from hosts 
in section two. Section three explain how to design and 
implement such system. We present our results in section four 
as well as explain our idea of detecting botnets. Finally, we 
will conclude and discuss our future work in section five. 
 
II.  DATA COLLECTION 
Our main goal is to detect botnets by monitoring the change 
of behaviour of log file sizes from different hosts and find 
the correlations between these log file sizes. To achieve this 
goal, we use a technique implemented by [5] to intercept API 
socket function calls produced by communication applications 
to generate our data. The intercepted API socket function calls 
and their arguments are stored in log files. 
We  use  a  system-wide intercepting technique  [8]  which 
monitors all threads currently running on the system to inter- 
cept API socket function calls such as send(), sendto(), recv(), 
recvfrom(), or connect(). One way to intercept an API socket 
function calls is to implement a Dynamic Link Library (DLL) 
file which replaces the target function to be intercepted (e.g. 
recv()) with an intercepted function (e.g. myrecv()) and then 
inject the DLL file into the address space of target process 
[4][10] (e.g Internet Relay Chat client - mIRC). 
Once the DLL is loaded into the target process (mIRC), 
it modifies the address of the target function (e.g. recv()) in 
the target process (mIRC) so that it jumps to the replacement 
function in the DLL (myrecv()). 
Algorithm 1: Correlation Algorithm 
forall logf iles  do 
read file sizes of each logf iles 
if all current file sizes did not change from the previous 
sizes then 
outf ile = generate zeros  correlation 
else if all current file sizes changed from the previous sizes 
then 
outf ile = generate ones  correlation 
and 1GB RAM. The virtual IRC  network consists of  four 
machines. One machine run Windows XP Pro SP2 and it is 
used as an IRC server. The remaining machines run Windows 
XP  Pro  SP2  and  have  IRC  clients.  Different  experiments 
are conducted to analyse normal behaviour and abnormal 
behaviour. Each experiment was running for 10 minutes in 
order to collect a reasonable amount of traffic. 
 
 
 
end 
else  
/* some current file sizes changed */ 
outf ile = generate uncorrelation 
 
B. Experiments 
 
We  conducted  some  initial  experiments  to  determine  if 
while !eof.outf ile do 
if zeros  correlation || ones  correlation then 
C V  + + /* Correlated Value (CV) */ 
else /* Uncorrelated Value (UCV) */ 
U C V  + + 
end 
end 
if C V  > T hreshold then 
suspicious activity is detected 
network  statistics  Logs  alone  are  sufficient to  detect  bots. 
For example, we monitor the change of behaviour of Internet 
Explorer (IE) vs. sdbot [9]. The results show that there is a 
sudden increase in log file size when the bot herder uses his bot 
to perform UDP, or ICMP flood against other systems. On the 
other hand, IE, which is used for browsing, checking emails, 
and other services not including downloading/uploading files, 
shows  a  smooth  increase  in  log  file  size.  After  that,  we end  
 
 
III.  DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 
investigate the normal behaviour of an mIRC clients vs. the 
sdbot. Monitoring changes of behaviour of normal mIRC 
clients and sdbot shows that there is a sudden change in the 
case of transferring large files between mIRC clients similar to 
System-wide interception can be used to monitor commu- 
nication applications. For example, it can be used to intercept 
API socket functions. Using this, we describe our algorithm 
in more details in this section. 
First, we intercept API socket function calls used by com- 
munication programs, and store them with their arguments into 
a log file. During this, another program is used to record the 
change of log file size. This record is made every second for 
a period of time t. We assume that the log files are protected 
and the attacker can not erase the log files. After a time t, 
the recorded data is passed to the analyser. The analyser reads 
the recorded data for each host and checks to see if there is 
a change from current state (e.g. t2 ) with previous state (e.g. 
t1 ) for all recorded data from different hosts. If there is a 
change, a value of one is produced, otherwise, a value of zero 
is produced. Note that we are not considering the amount of 
change at the moment. Both all zeros (i.e. no change between 
log files is made from different hosts) and all ones (i.e. all 
log files from different hosts are changed) mean correlation 
between data. 
For example, if there is no change between data sets at time 
t1 ,  (logfile1=0,logfile2=0,logfile3=0,...), then we have zeros 
change correlation. If there are changes in all data sets at time 
t1 , (logfile1=1,logfile2=1,logfile3=1,...), we have ones change 
correlation. Otherwise, an uncorrelated event is recorded. We 
will consider the amount of change between data sets in our 
future work. Our correlation algorithm is shown in Algorithm 
1. 
 
A. Full details of Architecture 
To  perform  our  experiments,  we  set  up  a  small  virtual 
IRC network on a VMWare machine. The VMWare machine 
runs under a Windows XP P4 SP2 with a 2.4GHz processor 
bot attack. In order to distinguish normal behaviour of mIRC 
clients and abnormal behaviour of bots, we analysed two cases: 
the normal case and the attack case. In the normal case, we 
analysed two scenarios: 
•  Three users having normal conversation. 
•  Three users having normal conversation and sending files 
to each other. 
In the attack case, we analysed two scenarios: 
•  Three bots join an IRC channel and remain idle for two 
minutes. After the idle period, the bots start to receive 
commands from their master (not including flood attack 
commands). 
•  Three bots join an IRC channel and remain idle for two 
minutes. After the idle period, the bots start to receive 
commands from their herder including flood attack com- 
mands. 
The generated results are passed to our correlation algorithm 
to distinguish normal behaviour and abnormal behaviour. Note 
that we have normalised the x-axis to 100 bytes in order to 
make the graphs more comparable. The next section explain 
our results in more detail. 
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 
We monitor the change of behaviour between mIRC clients 
and  sdbot.  The  results  in  Figure  1  show  that  it  might  be 
difficult to distinguish the normal behaviour from malicious 
behaviour because there is a noticeable change of log file size 
generated during a file transfer. We also notice that it is not 
sufficient to just look at network statistics. Therefore, we use 
our correlation algorithm to distinguish between normal and 
abnormal behaviour. 
  
 
Fig. 1.    Change of log file size (a user transfers files vs. a bot using UDP 
and ICMP flood. (100 ≡ 275085 bytes) 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.    Normal users behaviour without sending files. (100 ≡ 2754 bytes) 
 
 
A. Botnet Detection through Distributed Log Correlation 
The results from the previous experiment show that some- 
times it is difficult to distinguish the normal behaviour from 
malicious behaviour, e.g. when there is a sudden change of 
log file size. Therefore, we present our correlation detection 
scheme to distinguish between these two cases. 
The basic idea is to find correlated events in different hosts. 
Since we are dealing with botnets, there is a high probability 
of having correlated events such as sending similar amounts 
of data to a bot herder that occur within a specified time, or 
generating similar amounts of traffic to attack other systems. 
As a result, a high correlation between events is generated. 
A high correlation represents malicious activity, while a low 
correlation represents normal activity. 
We investigate the normal scenario of three users having 
normal conversation and using some IRC commands without 
transferring files to each other. The results show that there 
is a low correlation generated from the three users (Figure 
2). We also investigate the normal scenario of transferring 
files between users. The results show that even with a sudden 
change in log file size generated due to file transfer by user 
3, we still notice a low correlation between data (Figure 3). 
After simulating the normal cases, the three machines were 
infected by sdbot05b. This represents the two attack cases. 
Fig. 3.    Normal users behaviour with sending files. (100 ≡ 7248 bytes) 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.   Attack behaviour without flood. (100 ≡ 4121 bytes). The dot points 
represents a high correlation between bots 
 
 
In the first experiment, we investigate the attack scenario of 
three  bots  receiving  commands  from  their  bot  herder.  No 
flood attack  commands  were  received.  We  notice  that  the 
generated data is small but there is a high correlation between 
the changes of log file sizes (Figure 4). In the second attack 
scenario, the bots receive flood commands from their herder. 
The results show that there is an obvious malicious activity in 
the network. This can be seen from the sudden change of the 
amount of data generated and the high correlation between the 
changes of log file sizes (Figure 5). 
The  results  from  the  correlation  algorithm  is  shown  in 
Figure 6. The x-axis represents the normalized data while the 
y-axis represents the conducted experiments. We can see from 
the figure that we have a large number of uncorrelated events 
in the normal case. This represents a normal behaviour in 
our case since users are responding randomly to others. On 
the other hand, the uncorrelated events in the attack case are 
generated due to the fact that sometimes there is a delay of 
responding to the bot herder’s commands. We also notice that 
there is a large number of correlated events in the normal case. 
There are many reasons for this. The first reason is that we 
are running our experiments in virtual machines and switching 
between virtual machines takes some time. Another reason is 
that we are recording our data every second. Since, we have 
  
 
Fig. 5.    Attack behaviour with UDP flood. (100 ≡ 94050 bytes) 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.    Correlation between log files 
 
 
only one person (simulating to be three), recording data every 
second produces a large number of correlated events in the 
normal case. 
To test how good our algorithm is  in  detecting botnets, 
we use a Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) analysis as 
shown in Figure 7. The x-axis represents a cumulative false 
positive rates while the y-axis represents the cumulative true 
positive rates. 
We set our threshold as a percentage of log file size. As 
we vary the threshold from 0% to 100%, we notice that our 
correlation algorithm detects abnormal activity when the value 
of threshold is above 70% of the total amount of data and 
produce zero true negative. Reducing our threshold to 70% 
generates one false positive (i.e. normal behaviour detected as 
attack). Setting the threshold below 70% generates two false 
positive while maitaining 100% detection rate. 
 
V.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Our results show that it is sometimes difficult to distinguish 
between normal behaviour and malicious behaviour. There- 
fore, we used an algorithm to detect bots based on change 
of behaviour by correlating events from different hosts. The 
correlation algorithm shows that there is a high number of 
correlated events in attack case generated by bots compared to 
normal users. Our future work will focus on detecting botnets 
 
Fig. 7. The ROC curve - false positive rate vs. true positive rate. The 
percentages represent the threshold used. 
 
 
based on not only finding correlation between events, but also 
monitoring the number of API function calls to detect a single 
bot in the host. We will use this approach to detect abnormal 
behaviour in Peer-to-Peer network. 
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